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What’s in a name? Mapping the terrain of 
informal institutions and gender politics 
Louise Chappell and Fiona Mackay 
Institutionalist scholars of most hues – including feminist institutionalists (FI) – 
increasingly confer equal status on informal and formal institutions as factors explaining 
political outcomes. However, as Georgina Waylen outlines in Chapter 1 of this volume, 
to date the specific nature and influence of informal rules, norms and practices – and the 
effect of interactions between the formal and informal – have been under-theorized and 
underplayed in empirical studies in both gendered and non-gendered institutionalist 
analyses in political science. These trends are slowly changing as comparative scholars – 
including FI researchers – turn their attention to informal institutions for explaining 
differences in political life, and political outcomes included comparative analyses of the 
global North and South (Helmke and Levitsky 2004; Bjarnegård 2013; Piscopo 2016). 
This chapter seeks to support these crucial efforts to incorporate formal and informal 
institutional analyses into feminist political science (FPS) generally, and feminist 
institutionalism specifically, by laying out some of the foundational concepts and 
approaches regarding informal institutions in particular, and identifying the contours of 
key research developments in the area. 
Whether implicitly or explicitly, feminist scholars in particular have been unable 
to ignore the informal in their examination of political life. A central insight of FPS is 
that the ‘dynamics of institutional power relations, resistance, reproduction, continuity 
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and change need to be filtered through a gendered lens’ (Mackay 2004, 113; see also 
Chappell 2006; Kenny 2007). Informal gender institutions – including masculine and 
feminine norms, and daily gendered practices that maintain hierarchies of status and 
domination, and reproduce expectations about ‘appropriate’ men’s and women’s 
capacities, behaviour and duties – are central to shaping political processes and outcomes, 
including who has access to political power and to material and symbolic resources. The 
challenge for researchers is that these rules are often taken for granted – usually 
submerged and barely visible – and are therefore difficult to study. Finding the right 
methods to ‘see’ informal institutions is essential, especially as it is through these rules, 
norms and practices that wider particular arrangements and power asymmetries are 
naturalized and institutionalized, and sometimes resisted and discarded, across 
institutional arenas. 
In this chapter we argue that in order to extend the range and analytical leverage 
of FI in particular, and FPS in general, the necessary next stage of our work is to develop 
a common vocabulary of gendered institutionalist analysis, and to more systematically 
specify and operationalize key concepts, including the notion of an informal institution 
itself. We accept that this is no easy task: the wider institutionalist literature is fraught 
with definitional disputes and, ‘the operationalization of institutionalist concepts is 
frustratingly vague or surprisingly flexible’ (Lowndes 2014, 685). Indeed, we 
acknowledge our own struggles over time to clarify these slippery concepts, and accept 
that our position may provoke disagreement. We concur with Vivien Lowndes that FI 
should seize the opportunity – and take up the challenge – to produce greater conceptual 
clarity and more careful operationalization of key concepts (Peters 2012, 53; Lowndes 
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2014, 685). However, in attempting to contribute to this task here, we nonetheless retain 
our commitment to empirical complexity and the need to capture the ‘messiness’ of real 
world scenarios, and do so in the knowledge that parsimonious models often obscure 
rather than illuminate gender. 
In working towards greater clarity about informal institutions and their 
relationship to gender politics, this chapter sets out to answer four core questions: 
1. What are informal institutions and how do they differ from, and interact with, 
formal institutions? 
2. What is the relationship between gender and informal institutions? 
3. How do institutions, actors and networks differ? (Or, in other words, what is and 
is not an institution?) 
4. How do we research informal institutions in order to capture their gendered nature 
and effects? 
Ultimately, in addressing these questions, we hope to be able to contribute to 
strengthening FI’s ability to build and test theory, and to consolidate the rich empirical 
findings and theoretical insights emerging from feminist scholarship investigating the 
interactions between formal and informal institutions in a variety of arenas. We also seek 
to draw some boundaries around FI and be clear about what its distinguishing features are 
vis-à-vis other feminist approaches. This includes, first, making a distinction between the 
roles of institutions and actors in shaping political and policy outcomes, starting with the 
assumption that institutions are likely to matter as much if not more than anything else in 
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explaining the determinants of political life. Second, suggesting that contests over the 
political rules of the game are fundamentally about power, and that power is gendered. 
What is an informal institution, and how do they 
differ and interact with formal institutions? 
Institutions, it is generally agreed, are ‘relatively enduring features of political and social 
life (rules, norms and procedures) that structure behavior and cannot be changed easily or 
instantaneously’ (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 4). They are, at a minimum, ‘systems of 
rules that work together to coordinate social [and political] behavior’ (Raymond et al. 
2014, 198). While accepting these broad definitions, institutionalists take different 
positions on the specific features, operations and effects of institutions, including on the 
key definitional questions of what constitutes formal and informal institutions. Some 
perceive formal and informal as existing on a continuum, and measured in gradations (see 
Raymond et al. 2014, 198). In this view, the formal is an outgrowth or crystallization of 
the informal, existing on a spectrum from taboos and customs through to written 
constitutions (North 1990, 46). For Olsen, ‘evolving behavioural patterns are “frozen” 
into habits and traditions, and formally codified’ (Olsen 2009, 6). Others see the 
relationship more dichotomously, conceiving the two as mirrors of each other (Helmke 
and Levitsky 2004). Whichever view is adopted, as Waylen (2014a, 213) suggests, 
‘informal institutions cannot be looked at in isolation or as separate – they must be 
analyzed alongside any formal institutions that they are linked to and with which they 
interact’. 
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Institutionalist scholar Vivien Lowndes is one who argues against a ‘strict 
separation between informal and formal rules or prejudging their relative significance’ 
(2014, 687–8) preferring to use Ostrom’s term ‘rules-in-use’. Rules-in-use are defined as 
the distinctive ensemble of ‘dos and don’ts that one learns on the ground’ (Ostrom 2005, 
38; Lowndes 2014, 688), which are a mix of the formal and informal, and which express 
‘institutional linkages across political and nonpolitical domains’ (Lowndes 2014, 688). 
But we suggest, before one can understand what are the rules-in-use, there is a prior task 
which is to excavate and identify the nature of formal and informal institutions in order to 
specify which informal elements comprise the gendered rules-in-use. Only then can we 
analyse how the informal and formal institutions interact; how actors deploy the mix; 
and, what the gendered outcomes are of these arrangements. 
Formal institutions are generally understood as being consciously designed and 
clearly specified (Lowndes and Wilson 2003), and disseminated and enforced through 
official channels (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). Formal rules are identifiable though codes 
of conduct, contracts, procedures, policies and laws, for example. Although this seems 
relatively settled, there is a surprising uncertainty around what is (not) a formal institution 
among political scientists. While there is not space in this chapter for a full discussion, 
we think this fuzziness arises from the dissonance between common sense and holistic 
understandings of political institutions (as bureaucracies, executives, legislatures, 
political parties etc.) and the commitment to disaggregated and differentiated conceptions 
of institutions within institutional analysis as: ‘sets of rules that exist ‘within’ and 
‘between’ organizations, “as well as under, over and around them”’ (Fox and Miller 
1995, 92; Lowndes 2010, 67). This second conceptualization can be counter-intuitive; 
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indeed highly disaggregated understandings of political institutions can also reduce our 
ability to speak with comparative scholars. For the most part, we think the use of 
‘institutional arenas’ – for example, the Westminster parliament as an institutional arena 
– works well as a means to bridge understandings of political institutions across 
conventional and institutionalist accounts. We do not suggest that either 
conceptualization is right or wrong, but we do think there will always be a need to clearly 
specify how we are conceptualizing and using political institutions in any given context. 
Whatever the definition of formal institutions is used, we can accept that they are 
distinguished by being official, visible and codified. They are also distinguished by their 
enforcement mechanisms, including through legal recognition and regulation, by the 
power of the state or other official sources. In contrast, informal institutional rules are 
often ‘hidden from view’, tacit and undocumented (Lauth 2000; Helmke and Levitsky 
2004) and enforced through unofficial sanctions, including shunning, social ostracism 
and violence (Grzymala-Busse 2010, 313; Waylen  2014a, 214), or indeed through 
positive rewards (see Chappell and Galea, this volume). Informal institutions usually 
operate through more opaque means – especially norms, practices and narratives (Helmke 
and Levitsky 2004; Lowndes and Roberts 2013). For political scientists Julia Azari and 
Jennifer Smith (2012, 39), informal institutions exist ‘when shared expectations outside 
the official rules of the game structure political behaviour’. 
While it is important to differentiate between formal and informal rules, it is also 
necessary to distinguish between informal rules and other patterns of behaviour lest 
informal institutions become a ‘catch all’, and analytically powerless. They need to be 
distinguished from those norms that are more cultural in nature, such as raising an 
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umbrella when it rains (Azari and Smith 2012) or removing a coat in a restaurant 
(Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 727). For Lowndes (2014, 686), informal political 
institutional rules are distinct from such personal habits or ‘rules of thumb’ in that they 
are specific to a particular political or governmental setting; recognized by actors (if not 
always adhered to); collective (rather than personal) in their effect; subject to some sort 
of third-party enforcement (formal or informal); and able to be described and explained 
to the researcher. Not all institutionalists would agree with every element of Lowndes’ 
definition – again highlighting the challenge of pinning down these concepts. For 
instance, we would argue that the recognition/description element may not always be 
evident. Gendered institutions in particular – such as the timing of political meetings 
which make it impossible for carers to participate, or careers built on the presumption of 
a ‘stay at home wife’ – are often not recognized, especially by those institutional actors 
who are advantaged by them, at least until they are called out. 
Refining current definitions, we would argue that informal institutions are 
distinguished by the following traits: 
• Enduring rules, norms and practices that shape collective behaviour that may or 
may not be recognized by institutional actors; 
• Have a collective effect; 
• Are usually not codified; 
• Are enforced through sanctions and rewards from within or outwith an 
institutional arena; 
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As with formal institutions, informal institutions perform a variety of functions. 
The informal can work to ‘weaken, substitute for, or work in parallel with’, formal 
institutions (Radnitz 2011, 352). Actors can employ informal rules to undermine formal 
rules to bring about change (see Hinojosa this volume) or to maintain the status quo 
against attempts at reform (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). Informal institutions can also 
distort and stymie formal institutions (Levitsky and Slater 2011). Informal institutions 
can fill in the gaps where formal institutions are incomplete, operate as ‘a second best 
strategy’ when it is difficult to change formal institutions, or allow actors to pursue goals 
not publicly acceptable including unpopular or illegal activities (Helmke and Levitsky 
2004, 730; Azari and Smith 2012, 41). As Helmke and Levistky (2006, 3) note, the 
interaction between formal and informal institutions leads to ‘myriad, complex and often 
unexpected effects: whereas some informal rules compete with and subvert democratic 
institutions, others complement and even help sustain them’. 
A general point of agreement about informal institutions is that because of their 
submerged nature, their gradual evolution and embeddedness in organizational operations 
makes them very ‘sticky’ and difficult to shift (Lauth 2000); they have, as North notes, a 
‘tenacious survival ability’ (1990, 45). But this is not to argue that institutions are 
impervious to change. Working through the ‘constructive’ gaps that emerge between 
formal and informal rules, actors can shift existing informal institutions (Mahoney and 
Thelen 2010, Sheingate 2010; Waylen 2014a; Chappell 2016), or indeed create new ones 
through layering, conversation and other methods (Mahoney and Thelen 2010). As 
Raymond et al. (2014, 198) discussed, informal institutions, operating via norms, can 
bring about change and transformation of existing institutional arrangements, due to their 
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‘ambiguity and malleability’. While much of this change is understood to occur 
incrementally, sometimes change can occur rapidly, for instance informal rules can shift 
abruptly when changes in formal rules ‘create incentives for actors to modify or abandon 
the informal rule’ (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 732). 
FI also agree that formal and informal ‘rules of the game’ exist, that each has 
defining features, as well as interaction effects which shape political and policy 
outcomes. 
What is the relationship between gender and 
informal institutions? 
A key contribution of feminist institutionalism (FI) to institutional analysis is to bring a 
gendered perspective to the field. Its first important intervention has been to show that 
formal and informal political institutions are gendered – in that they are normatively 
organized around stereotypes about men’s and women’s attributes, experiences and 
abilities, and symbolically valorize masculine traits, especially hegemonic ones, over 
feminine ones. As such, they embody and reproduce particular patterns of status and 
domination. The second intervention is to reveal the gender effects of rules, norms and 
practices, including on access to and distribution of political power and resources, on 
political and policy outcomes, and on political change. Here we unpack the relationship 
between gender and (informal) institutions along three axes: gendered institutional logics, 
particularly logics of appropriateness; gender and power; and gender and change 
including the significance of the gendered environment. 
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Gendered institutional logics 
Institutional logics provide the organizing principles, vocabularies of motivation and 
action, and the overall framework of sense-making in a particular institutional arena 
(Thornton and Ocasio 2008). While rational choice institutionalists have typically 
focused upon instrumental logics – based upon calculus and the weighing up of 
consequences – following the groundbreaking work of March and Olsen (1989, 161), 
new institutionalism has placed great emphasis on informal institutions as creating 
institutional ‘logics of appropriateness’. In a manner analogous with Ostrom’s rules-in-
use, institutional logics comprise the combination of formal and informal rules and 
practices which comprise the ‘world view’ of actors in a particular institutional arena, and 
which constrain some forms of agency while encouraging others: ‘institutional logics are 
embodied in practices, sustained and reproduced by cultural assumptions, and political 
struggles’ (Thornton and Ocasio 2008, 101). Although this logic is not impermeable, it is 
difficult to unsettle as it is perpetuated by institutional actors who ‘embody and reflect 
existing norms and beliefs’ (McAdam and Scott 2005, 15) and who seek to maintain the 
rules. 
FI have drawn on this concept of institutional logics of appropriateness to explore 
how institutional rules, norms and practices operate to create a specific ‘gendered logic of 
appropriateness’ (see Stivers 2002; Chappell 2006). Their work points to the way 
political arenas such as parliaments and executives are structured by gender-biased 
assumptions and ‘dispositions’ that underpin their operation (Mackay and Waylen 2009; 
Annesley and Gains 2010; Mackay, Kenny and Chappell 2010; Krook and Mackay 2011; 
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Bjarnegård 2013; Kenny 2013). Formal rules can contribute to a logic of appropriateness 
– for instance, through instantiating overtly discriminatory rules that ban women from 
participating in certain professions – such as frontline soldiers – or by disallowing their 
engagement in political activities – such as denying female enfranchisement. However, 
more commonly, and working more subtly, are informal rules and norms which influence 
this logic, especially the masculine and feminine codes of appropriate behaviour that 
undergird institutional processes. These gender norms are present in all institutional 
settings, but the balance between them can shift according to the context. In political, 
bureaucratic and legal settings, a hegemonic masculine ideal – representing rationality, 
strength and toughness – tends to be ‘culturally exalted’ (Connell 2000, 84): these are the 
symbolic codes that shape institutional ‘ways of valuing things, ways of behaving, and 
ways of being’ (Duerst-Lahti and Kelly 1995, 20). The antithesis is femininity – 
represented by traits of passivity, nature, care, emotion and irrationality – which tend to 
be devalued in political life. 
Gendered institutional logics have two key effects. First, they prescribe (as well as 
proscribe) ‘acceptable’ masculine and feminine forms of behaviour within institutional 
arenas. At the heart of gendered logics of appropriateness in political life is the coding of 
public authority, and political presence and agency as culturally masculine. Because men 
tend to be associated with masculine codes and women with feminine ones, the gendered 
logic of appropriateness maintains dominant categories of men in powerful positions and 
keeps women (and men from marginalized categories) in the role of the ‘other’, viewed 
as ‘space invaders’ (Puwar 2004) in the political realm. Elin Bjarnegård’s work on 
homosocial capital demonstrates this point, showing how masculine privilege accrues 
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capital and pays political dividends, through political networks founded on ‘sameness’ or 
homosociality (2013). Second, these logics influence political outcomes. The policies, 
legislation, and rulings that are the outcome of political institutional processes are imbued 
with gender norms through exposure to the logic of appropriateness: these in turn help to 
(re)produce broader social and political gender expectations, including for instance the 
contours of the welfare state (O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999), and women’s political 
participation (Hern 2016). These are what Gains and Lowndes (2014) call ‘rules with 
gender effects’, as opposed to ‘rules about gender’ such as parental leave, equal pay or 
anti-gender discrimination policies. 
Feminists interested in exploring these gendered logics have been careful to point 
out that they do not present in the same way in all institutional settings. As Lovenduski’s 
important foundational work in this area argued, institutions have distinctively gendered 
cultures and are involved in processes of producing and reproducing gender in different 
ways (1998, 348). What we know from comparative work on gender and various 
institutional settings – including parliaments (Childs 2004; Mackay 2014a) electoral 
systems (Krook et al. 2006), bureaucracies and women’s policy agencies (Stetson and 
Mazur 1995; Chappell 2002; Stivers 2002) executives (Annesley, Beckwith and 
Franceschet 2015) and political parties (Kenny 2011, 2013; Bjarngård and Kenny 2015; 
Kenny and Verge 2016) – is that the gendered logic of appropriateness is complex and 
plays out differently in similar institutions in different polities and different institutions 
within the same polity. Taking this area of research forward requires being attentive to 
these differences and asking questions about how, where and why gendered logics of 
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appropriateness differ across institutional settings, and what difference this makes to 
gendered political outcomes. 
Gender, informal institutions and power 
Understanding the gendered nature of political institutions provides tools for 
understanding how political power is constructed, how it functions, and how it might be 
reconfigured. This insight rests upon the claim of feminist social science – including 
feminist political scientists – that gender is one of the principal means by which power 
operates by normalizing and naturalizing asymmetries. As V. Spike Peterson argues: 
gender invokes ‘a deeply internalised and naturalised binary – the dimorphism of “sex 
difference” – which is then available to naturalize diverse forms of structural oppression’ 
(2015, 178). Thus gender power naturalizes masculine advantage, ‘setting the terms of 
normal, just, and proper arrangements for political and social power’ (Duerst-Lahti 2008, 
165) and enhancing the legitimacy, status and power of already powerful groups, while 
doing ‘the political work of making the limited options and precarious lives of 
subordinated groups seem somehow inevitable rather than unconscionable’ (Peterson 
2015, 178). 
This naturalization has not occurred through a conscious strategy on behalf of all 
men to dominate all women. As Hooper argues: ‘men gain access to power and privilege 
not by virtue of their anatomy but through their cultural association with masculinity’ 
(2001, 41). Men’s access to power has been reinforced over time through ‘constantly 
repeated processes of exclusion’ of women (Lovenduski 2005, 50), and through 
organizational rules, routines, policies and discourses that have rendered ‘women, along 
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with their needs and interests, invisible’ (Acker 1992, 567; Hawkesworth 2005, 147). 
Concepts of gender power thus allow us to expose and explain why seemingly neutral 
rules can result in outcomes that profoundly disadvantage women (and marginalized 
groups of men) and also the way in which institutions – as gender regimes (Connell 
2002) – reinforce the status quo. 
The concept of gender regimes, developed by the Australian sociologist Raewyn 
Connell (2002), is widely referenced within FI as part of a repertoire of gendered 
frameworks (see, for example, Lovenduski 2011; Chappell and Waylen 2013). Gender 
regimes, developed in organizational analysis, provide a framework of interconnecting 
institutions that comprise the overall pattern of gender arrangements in a formal 
institutional arena, such as a legislature, a state bureaucracy, a judiciary or a political 
party. A gender regime involves four dimensions: a gendered division of labour; 
gendered relations of power (including the way in which control, authority or force is 
organized along gendered dimensions); gendered patterning of emotions and emotional 
labour; and gendered culture and symbolism (including cultural scripts about gender 
difference, prevailing gender norms etc.) (Connell 2002, 53–58). Each dimension is the 
sum of previous and ongoing gender contestations. The dimensions will include formal 
elements but predominantly will comprise informal rules, norms and practices. 
Paying attention to gender regimes in a specific institutional setting makes visible 
the asymmetry of institutional power relations (Kenny 2007, 96) and makes us look at 
how particular combinations of formal rules, informal norms and everyday practices play 
out, underpinned by specific narratives, and with what effects. For example, local 
variation in gender patterns may create ambiguities and contradictions that open up 
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spaces for contestation and change, as well as providing rich resources for resistance. 
Gender regimes are highly influential as concepts, but examples of systematic application 
are rarer and it will be a key task of FI to systematically apply and develop gender 
regimes as part of wider theory building processes. 
Gender, informal institutions and change 
The overtly ‘feminist’, normative, aspect of feminist institutionalism is most apparent in 
its concern to better understand how existing formal, but more importantly informal, 
institutions can be disrupted to bring about greater gender equal political outcomes, in 
terms of representation, recognition and redistribution (Mackay 2008 Chappell 2016). 
Theoretically, acknowledging the existence of a gender regime provides insights into the 
power dimension of political institutions; it also points to a potential mechanism of 
change. As Karen Beckwith notes, if institutions are gendered, they surely can be 
regendered, including in ways that disrupt current patterns of power and inequality 
(2005). Recent research has shown that the effect of informal institutions in bringing 
about change is not predictable. They can in some instances play a reinforcing role, 
maintaining the gender status quo, but they can also be transformative in regendering 
political processes and outcomes. 
The weight of extant FI scholarship on informal institutions points towards 
informal rules acting to preserve the gender status quo, or gendered logic of 
appropriateness, in the face of reform efforts, including reform where there has been the 
creation of new formal rules and policy frameworks. Attention has been paid to the role 
of the informal in instances where the formal rules have changed, for example to promote 
12/12/2019 16028-0013-002.docx:  50 
gender equality and address gender injustice, but where implementation is patchy and 
outcomes are negligible in terms of positive change, such as in the area of gender quota 
subversion (see Piscopo 2015; Verge and Espírito-Santo 2016). Informal mechanisms of 
resistance and contestation include ‘forgetting’ new rules and norms and ‘remembering’ 
the old, including the reassertion of traditional gender norms (Leach and Lowndes 2007; 
Mackay 2014a). Research has demonstrated how actors draw upon informal institutions 
to underpin strategies of partial or non-compliance, for example Chappell’s (2016) work 
on the International Criminal Court, which highlights how judicial interpretations that 
uphold ‘gender norms that treat women’s rights as less significant than other rights’. 
Further, work on political recruitment (Kenny 2013) – highlights how informally 
sanctioned rule-breaking, lack of rule enforcement and adoption of alternative 
conventions – has thwarted the implementation of policies aimed at increasing women’s 
entry into politics. 
As Azari and Smith note, it is important that informal institutions are 
characterized not only as ‘historic hang-overs’ and not always as negative, but also as 
sometimes positive and creative outcomes of contemporary institutional dilemmas (Azari 
and Smith 2012, 49) As such, attention in FI research is increasingly being drawn 
towards identifying how informal institutions can engender change (Waylen 2014a; 
Chappell 2016) and towards theorizing how political arenas may be regendered (in a 
positive direction) through the mobilization of informal rules and norms. The work of 
Beyler and Annesley (2011) on regendering aspects of the welfare state; Jennifer Piscopo 
(this volume) on using informal rules and norms to strengthen gender quotas in Mexico, 
and in Sweden and France (Friedenvall and Krook 2011); Leigh Raymond et al (2014) on 
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shifting norms to develop anti-violence against women policies and Annesley et al (2015) 
on the incorporation of gender equality in Cabinet appointment processes are all cases in 
point. We agree with Walyen (2014, 214) that ‘this new emphasis on the potential 
dynamism and mutability of informal institutions can make a significant contribution to 
the burgeoning discussions of the interaction of formal and informal institutions in 
institutional change’. 
Given the congealed, embedded and often unrecognized nature of informal gender 
norms, practices and rules, future researchers are encouraged not (only) to search for 
major instances of change – the ‘punctuated equilibria’ many historical institutionalist 
might look for – but to pay attention to micro-shifts that occur within an institutional 
arena (see Chappell 2016 as an example). In undertaking an FI analysis, we suggest it is 
important to pay attention to the ‘small wins’ that may well add up over time to a 
significant institutional transformation (see Chappell and Mackay 2015; Chappell 2016, 
Chapter 7). We also suggest that researchers pay more attention to the ‘constructive 
ambiguities’ (Oosterveld 2014; Chappell 2016) embedded in formal rules – which we 
have found in our work on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2016) 
and the operational rules of UN Women (Mackay 2013) – can provide the gaps through 
which informal rules can operate- sometime to advance progressive gender justice 
interpretations, although sometimes also in the opposite direction. 
What is not an informal institution? Actors and 
networks 
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An area of some ambiguity in both the general and FI literature is the relationship 
between institutions, actors and networks, and what is not an informal institution. This is 
important because to elide actors or networks and other phenomena with informal 
institutions muddles analysis and runs the danger of making informal institutions a 
residual category. In this section, we discuss the distinction we see between these entities 
in order to provide some greater analytical precision to our understanding of these 
relationships. 
In entering this territory, we are aware that we are travelling towards one of the 
fundamental debates in the social sciences – the distinction between agency and structure 
– and the attendant ontological and epistemological considerations this brings (for a 
detailed discussion on structure and agency see Hay 2002). For the purposes of this 
discussion, we simply want to point out that as FI we consider institutions – which sit 
somewhere on the structural side of the explanatory continuum – as having a primary or 
more significant role compared to actors and agency, for understanding political life. In 
adopting this position, we do not suggest that agency and actors are unimportant, to the 
contrary; rather, our position is that institutional forces will always mediate the influence 
of actors on political outcomes to a greater or lesser degree, and in some cases the 
relationship will be co-constitutive. However, even where actors and institutions are 
conceived as co-constitutive, it is still necessary to be able to distinguish between the 
characteristics, mechanisms and effects of institutions on political phenomena from the 
actors who interpret, interact with, shape and are shaped by these institutions. 
In some institutionalist literature, including the feminist variant, actors and 
agencies have an ambiguous presence. Sometimes they are not mentioned at all, with a 
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sense that institutions magically appear and are then monitored, enforced and maintained 
as if by phantoms. Other times, actors lurk in the background, without a clear sense of the 
interaction between the rule ‘maker’ or ‘taker’ on institutional design or implementation. 
In other instances, it seems like actors rather than institutions are doing all the work, with 
no clear sense of what is ‘institutionalist’ at all about the analysis. We take our position 
on actors from John Campbell (2004, 72) who suggests that ‘institutions enable, empower 
and constitute actors by providing them with the principles and practices that they can use 
to modify existing institutional arrangements.’ But also agree with him that actors do not 
have unimpeded agency because ‘institutions also act as constraints by limiting the 
number of possible innovations that they [actors] can envision and make’. This chimes 
with Mahoney and Thelen’s view (2010, 28) that ‘[institutional] rules influence the 
particular type of actors that will emerge and thrive in any context, and the extent of 
reform possible’. We see actors then as having a critical role in shaping the nature, 
operations and effects of institutions, but in turn the features and context of institutional 
settings act to constrain the capacity of actors to design, bend and interpret the rules of 
the game – and ultimately, can limit their capacity to influence outcomes. 
Institutions constrain actors, but that is not all they do. We also agree, in line with 
Ostrom, and with Lowndes and Roberts (2013, 94), that institutions can be permissive – 
more or less so depending on the context – providing spaces for ‘rule breaking and 
shaping’ (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 90). The ‘creative agents’ able to take advantage 
of these opening can be the elites who sit at the top organizational hierarchies, but 
equally, they can be actors who exist at the base of the pyramid, who can adapt and resist 
rules, and sometimes force changes in the status quo (Lowndes and Roberts 2013, 105). 
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Identifying those contexts where external and non-elite actors can resist and bend the 
rules is especially important for those scholars seeking to understand the mechanisms that 
drive change in gendered institutions where masculine power is entrenched. Feminist 
scholars including FI scholars have often paid attention not just to political power brokers 
who may appear to set the rules, but also those grass-roots actors, social movements and 
lowly ranked individuals who refuse to play by the rules, whether formal or informal, and 
through their resistance promote disruption and change. Francesca Gains and Vivien 
Lowndes (2014, 528) remind us that in identifying the actors who make, interpret, 
enforce and resist the rules, we also need to pay attention to their gender attributes. As 
they note: ‘Actors occupy male or female (or transexual) bodies, their values and 
attitudes reflect different positions on a masculine/feminine spectrum, and they hold 
different perspectives on the gender power balance and possibilities for change (in the 
context of intersectional identities)’. 
Another area of uncertainty in institutionalist accounts is the place of networks. 
Research on institutions and networks has proceeded on largely separate trajectories over 
the past few decades. The former is more associated with work in organizational and 
political sociology, and the latter associated with economic sociology (Owen-Smith and 
Powell 2008). Like informal institutions (Gryzmala-Busse 2010), networks often arise to 
fill the space of incomplete institutions and to enable collective action in conditions of 
uncertainty (Schoenman 2014). Some authors argue they are co-constitutive (Owen-
Smith and Powell 2008), but even if this is the case, we agree with Azari and Smith 
(2014, 40), among others, that networks are not institutions. It is more useful perhaps to 
see networks as an intermediate variable: to conceive of them as vehicles for actor 
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engagement, and a key means to transmit and circulate ideas and practices, rather than as 
institutions themselves. Networks of actors instantiate institutions through daily practices, 
and through the deployment, contestation and subversion of formal and informal rules 
and norms. Networks are groups of actors, whereas institutions are the rules, norms and 
practices which set the context within which networks operate. Networks may deploy 
informal institutions; they may be the carriers of institutional effects (Owen-Smith and 
Powell 2008, 595); and network relations may shape trajectories of institutional 
development (Clemens 1993; Schoenman 2014) but they are not institutions in, and of, 
themselves. 
In empirical FI examples, networks (particularly homosocial networks) are often 
the key carriers of informal institutions, such as clientelism (Bjarnegård 2013); networks 
also provide actors with the resources to resist and subvert formal rule changes, such as 
gender quotas (see, for example, Piscopo (this volume)), although there are also instances 
of women’s networks created for the purposes of promoting gender reforms (see Nazneen 
(this volume)). To move FI scholarship forward, we need more work that further unpicks 
and unpacks the relationships between gendered actors, including networks, and formal 
and informal institutions. We need analyses that pay closer to attention to which 
(gendered) actors get to make the rules, under what conditions are they able to resist the 
rules, and to what ends. We also need closer examination of the work networks do in 
carrying the demands of collective actors into institutional settings and the resources 
these networks provide for challenging the old and instituting new formal and informal 
rules, norms and practices (see Verge and Claveria and Culhane in this volume as a 
starting point of these efforts). 
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How do we research informal institutions? 
Methodologically, it is a challenge for FI to identify ‘the complex matrix of rules’ 
(Lowndes 2014, 687), intersecting institutions and causal mechanisms and arrangements 
that produce gendered effects – particularly the reproduction of masculine dominance – 
in political life. While not underestimating the methodological challenges of capturing 
and analysing informal institutions, we concur with Azari and Smith (2012, 49) that 
‘informal rules can be identified with reasonable precision, observed in the world, and 
distinguished from other sources of patterned behavior, including strategic self-interest 
and the operation of formal rules’. For FI, undertaking a gendered analysis of any 
institutional arena requires three steps: the first step requires an analysis of the mix of the 
formal and informal ‘rules-in-use’, the next step is to identify what gendered logic, if any, 
underpins these rules, and then, finally, to consider their gendered effects and outcomes. 
Different scholars have experimented with a variety of tools in their efforts to pin down 
the various formal and informal institutions at play in any context, and to identify their 
patterns and effects. We outline a few of these here, but do not suggest these are the only 
techniques that can or should be used. 
In line with much historical institutionalist literature, much FI scholarship has 
adopted a comparative approach, looking across two or more cases to identify similarities 
and differences in institutional settings and the effect of these on gendered political 
outcomes. Chappell (2002), Krook (2009) and Waylen (2007, 2014b) are all examples of 
such an approach. In these comparative studies – and also in single case studies (see, for 
example, Kenny 2013) – within-case and cross-case analysis is undertaken using 
12/12/2019 16028-0013-002.docx:  57 
qualitative methods such as theory-driven process, tracing using documents and interview 
transcripts (Kenny 2013; Waylen 2014b). Rosemary Grey’s (2015) important study of 
prosecutorial discretion at the International Criminal Court is an interesting legal version 
of this approach, scrutinizing Court transcripts and other key documents to excavate 
gendered path dependencies across time (for a discussion of other legal methods see 
O’Rouke 2014). 
Challenging long-held feminist prejudices about the value of quantitative methods 
for studying institutions, Laurel Weldon (2014) has recently provided a convincing 
account of their value, in a mixed-methods framework. For Weldon, quantitative methods 
can never replace the rich, detailed accounts provided through qualitative methods, but 
they can help in bringing greater clarity to the ‘mushy, amorphous and shifting’ (Weldon 
2014, 662) contexts in which formal and informal institutions operate. Weldon identifies 
three core advantages in using statistical techniques: 
(1) the ability to summarize large quantities of information that are 
difficult to eyeball or summarize using traditional qualitative tools, (2) the 
ability to estimate the degree to which observed relationships can be 
attributed to chance, and (3) the ability to parse the degree to which 
different factors shape outcomes of interest. . . Cross-national comparisons 
also offer a greater ability to denaturalize local social practices 
(particularly useful to feminists seeking to critique male dominance). 
A good example of the value of a mixed-methods approach to the study of informal 
institutions is found in Bjarnegård’s work (2013, 2015), including her use of statistical 
techniques alongside interviews and observations to demonstrate how informal party 
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recruitment criteria such as an emphasis on family connections are connected with a 
higher representation of women in Asian politics. Verge and Claveria (in this volume; see 
also Claveria and Verge 2015) provide another example of mixed-methods approaches, 
using a combination of quantitative data and synthetic literature reviews to uncover 
common patterns and possible causal mechanisms in secondary data. 
A third and increasingly common method applied to the study of political 
institutions and gender is systematic in-depth ethnographies (for a discussion see Radnitz 
2011, 365–6; Chappell and Waylen 2013; Smith 2005). Ethnographic studies of 
parliaments are emerging (see Crewe 2014; also see Childs 2016) alongside political 
recruitment practices (Bjarnegård 2013), while Mackay’s work on UN Women (2013, 
2014b) highlights its value for understanding global institutions. In this volume, Chappell 
and Galea discuss the value of ‘rapid’ ethnography for identifying and understanding the 
gendered actors and effects of various enforcement mechanisms in the male-dominated 
realm of the Australian construction industry. Ethnographic work, while certainly 
important, can only be one strategy among many. Research findings have to be 
triangulated with other forms of data, for example with policy documents, rule books and 
reports, to help maintain a balance between actors and their institutional context. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we argue that in order to extend the range and analytical leverage of 
feminist institutionalism, the next essential stage of our work is to develop a common 
vocabulary of gendered institutionalist analysis, and to more systematically specify and 
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operationalize key concepts. Refining current definitions, we would argue that informal 
institutions are distinguished by the following traits: enduring rules, norms and practices 
that shape collective behaviour that may or may not be recognized by institutional actors; 
have a collective effect; are usually not codified; and are enforced through sanctions and 
rewards from within or outwith an institutional arena. 
Whether implicitly or explicitly, feminist scholars have been unable to ignore the 
informal in their examination of political life. Informal gender institutions are central to 
shaping political processes and outcomes, including who has access to political power 
and to material and symbolic resources. In real-life scenarios, there is a complex 
admixture of formal and informal, and we need to avoid overly strict separations between 
informal and formal rules, norms and practices or judging in advance their relative 
significance. As the emerging stock of FI cases indicate, and as demonstrated in this 
book, different configurations of formal and informal have different effects: sometimes 
formal and informal rules work together to maintain the gender status quo; at other times, 
the informal may compete, undermine or adapt formal rules in both positive and negative 
ways. How they play out will make a difference to opportunities for changes to the 
gender status quo and the existing gendered logic of appropriateness. We have argued 
that there is a prior task of excavating and identifying informal institutions to enable FI 
scholars to analyse how they interact with formal institutions, and with what gendered 
outcomes. Where are we now? We have identified a number of important informal 
institutions that interact with formal. 
Not everything is an (gendered) institution. If we are not careful about drawing 
some definitional boundaries, informal institutions, in particular, run the risk of becoming 
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a residual category. We have argued that it is important to specify what is, and what is 
not, an informal institution. We see actors and networks as working in, through, and 
against institutions but as separate to them. To be sure, networks will be more or less 
formalized, more or less institutionalized, and can have institutional effects, but they are 
collectivities of actors, rather than being institutions themselves. 
Studying informal institutions – their substantive characteristics and their 
gendered effects – requires the use of a variety of methods. We encourage a broad 
approach to the selection of methods, understanding that each provides a different insight 
and perspective to the multiple layered and often unpredictable processes and outcomes 
that institutions produce. We acknowledge that different methods will be more or less 
relevant depending on the temporal and contextual elements of the case at hand, and that 
researchers will need to be guided by these factors in their selection. One of the potential 
benefits of FI to the broader field of feminist political research is its methodological 
pluralism – the willingness of its adherents to engage with, test and extend mixed 
approaches to be able to gain insights into the gendered relations between formal and 
informal institutions, their reproductive mechanisms and effects. 
What is in a name? A lot – and if we are to extend the reach of FI, we need to 
develop some core common language, and specification of concepts. Doing so is not 
easy: there is always a trade-off between empirical richness and the winnowing and 
simplification required to gain analytic purchase, and gender scholars are rightly cautious 
about parsimony given the messiness of gendered political life. But more careful 
specification is essential: it enables us to build and test theory and to consolidate the 
empirical findings and theoretical insights of the growing body of FI work that addresses 
12/12/2019 16028-0013-002.docx:  61 
the interactions between formal and informal institutions. In other words it enables FI 
scholars to speak to ourselves and to others. Our argument is that FI can remain a big 
tent, but should not serve merely as a flag of convenience. 
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